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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
"Appearance in person or by attorney. A party who is of
full age may prosecute or defend a civil action in person or by
attorney unless he has been judicially declared to be incompe-
tent to manage his affairs. If a party has an attorney in the
action he cannot appear to act in person except with the con-
sent of the court. Any corporation or voluntary association
must appear by an attorney-at-law duly licensed to practice
under the laws of this state." (Italics ours.)
Section 280 of the Penal Law was amended by striking therefrom
the words "other than itself." The omission of these words from the
Penal Law destroys the contention in the Victor & Co. case that the
intent of the Legislature was to permit the appearance in person by a
corporation by immunizing them from liability.
III.
Through these amendments, a corporation now has absolutely no
right to appear in person, since the so-called "enabling statutes" have
been amended to exclude definitely corporate bodies, and the immu-
nizing section has been amended, striking out the immunity. A cor-
poration is now subject to prosecution for practicing law, even if it
appears in person.
The corporations may see fit to contest Section 236 as being
unconstitutional, on the ground that they are denied equal protection
of the laws under the United States Constitution. By Section 37 of
the General Business Law the term "person" includes corporations,
and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
states that: " * * * nor shall any state * * * deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 34 However, a prob-
able answer is that corporations are mere creatures of statutes 35 and
may, therefore, be regulated by the state which created them.
SEYMOUR C. SIMON.
PUBLIC SALARY TAX ACT OF 1939.-Ever since the Federal Gov-
ernment has undertaken to combat the evils caused by the great
world-wide economic depression, the burden of our national debt has
become steadily more onerous. The governmental measures taken to
bring about a financial recovery, although they are quite different
34 3 WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed.
1929) 1931 ("The provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee to indi-
viduals and to corporations that they shall not by state law be excluded from
the enjoyment of privileges which other persons and corporations similarly
circumstanced enjoy, or that they may not have imposed upon them burdens
which others similarly circumstanced are free from").
35 N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW; N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW.
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from one another in many respects, all have one attribute in common.
They are expensive. Thus, the National Government has had to
make pecuniary outlays. As a consequence Congress has found it
necessary to accumulate funds for the Treasury with greater rapidity.
Accordingly, new and different sources of and methods for taxation
have been discovered and devised by the Legislators. One of the new
tax laws is aimed at the salaries of governmental and state employees;
popularly it is called the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939.
That the power of taxing the people and their property is essen-
tial to the very existence of government, is a well settled constitu-
tional doctrine.1 Moreover, the Sixteenth Amendment provides the
Federal Government with the power to tax private incomes.2 How-
ever, the determination as to whether such right extends to govern-
mental functions, and to the compensation paid its officers and em-
ployees engaged in a governmental capacity, has been greatly re-
sponsible for a vast amount of litigation. The problem has been
whether this constitutional power to impose taxes is subject to
limitation.
Since the Federal Government is a government by virtue of dele-
gated powers granted expressly by the people and contained in the
United States Constitution,3 it cannot exercise any authority except
that expressly or impliedly granted it by the Constitution. There is
no express provision in the Constitution prohibiting the Federal Gov-
ernment from taxing the instrumentalities of the state nor is there
any such provision in regard to the states taxing instrumentalities of
the Federal Government. It follows as a necessary corollary that
taxation of the compensation paid to officers and employees of state
and Federal Government, is likewise not expressly prohibited. Such
exemption, if it exists, must rest upon implication.4
The application of implied immunity descends from McCulloch
v. The State of Maryland," decided in 1819, where the State of Mary-
land sought to impose a tax upon notes of a bank of the United
States. From this case was derived the doctrine that immunity from
taxation was essential to the preservation of our dual system of gov-
ernment, the independence of each government within its respective
sphere. The doctrine, that "the power to tax involves the power to
destroy", 6 brought forth the conviction that the dual system of gov-
ernment might disappear if each were permitted to tax the other.7
1 U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have power to lay and
collect taxes * * * ").
2 U. S. CoNsT. Amend. XVI ("The Congress shall have the power to lay
and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived").
3 U. S. CoNsT. Preamble; U. S. CoxsT. Art. I, § 1.
4 U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("to make all laws which shall be neces-
sary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers").
5 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819).
8 McCulloch v. The State of Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 431 (U. S. 1819).
7 Dobbins v. Commissioner of Erie County, 16 Pet. 435 (U. S. 1842);
Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (U. S. 1870); Waneless Iron Co. v. Commis-
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In 1842, the tax immunity of the governmental employee was
conceived in Dobbins v. Commissioner of Erie County,8 which held
the income of a federal officer exempt from state tax. Collector v.
Day,9 in 1870, held the salary of a state judicial officer exempt from
federal tax. Both these cases reiterated the doctrine laid down in
McCulloch v. The State of Maryland. From these cases sprang a
growing area of tax immunity '0 because they created another doc-
trine, which the Constitution does not state, namely, that the im-
munities are correlative. Since the National Government is immune
from state taxation, therefore the state government must be immune
from federal taxation.. As the result of fusion of these two hypoth-
eses there arose a confusion as to what constituted a governmen-
tal function. The courts took cognizance only of essential and usual
governmental functions, thus narrowing the basis of exemption."
Since 1937 there has been evidenced a positive trend away from
tax immunity.12 The old fears, that the dual system of government
might disappear if one could tax the other, have been abating.13 Al-
though in Canada and Australia, where substantially the same ques-
tion of taxation exists, 14 the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity
was at first followed, the Supreme Court of Canada and the High
Court of Australia eventually rejected the doctrine completely. Sub-
sequent decisions of the United States Supreme Court limited the in-
terpretation of the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity. No longer
can it be thought that the power to tax involves the power to de-
sioner of Internal Revenue, 75 F. (2d) 779 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935) ; Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Modjeski, 75 F. (2d) 468 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); Halsey
v. Helvering, 75 F. (2d) 234 (D. of C. 1934); Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S.
214, 55 Sup. Ct. 171 (1934).
8 16 Pet. 435 (U. S. 1842).
9 11 Wall. 113 (U. S. 1870).
10 Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501 (1877) (wherein it was held that
states cannot tax United States patents) ; Mercantile Bank v. New York, 121
U. S. 138, 7 Sup. Ct. 826 (1887) (exemption of municipal bonds from federal
tax); California v. Cent. Pac. R. R., 127 U. S. 1, 8 Sup. Ct. 1073 (1887)(state cannot tax a federal corporate franchise); Indian Motorcycle Co. v.
United States, 283 U. S. 570, 51 Sup. Ct. 601 (1931) (sale of motorcycles to
municipal corporation for use in its police service is not subject to federal
taxation).
"I Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342 (1911) ; Helver-
ing v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214, 55 Sup. Ct. 171 (1934) ; United States v. Cali-
fornia, 297 U. S. 175, 56 Sup. Ct. 421 (1936).
12 (1939) 17 TEx. L. REv. 452; (1939) 11 RocxY MT. L. Rv. 200; (1939)
12 So. CALIF. L. Riv. 417.
13 Lewinsohn, Tax Exempt Salaries and Securities: A Re-examination
(1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 685.4 B SrrISH NORTH AMERICAN ACT, 30, 31 VIcT. c. 3; COMMONWEALTH OF
AUSTRALIA CONSTITUTION AT, 63, 64, VIcT. c. 12. See Bank of Toronto v.
Lambe, [1887] 12 A. C. 575; Forbes v. Attorney-General for Manitoba, [1937]
35 T. L. R. 211; Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co.,[1920[ 28 C. L. R. 129; Webb v. Outtrim, [1907] A. C. 81; Caron v. The
King, [1924] A. C. 999.
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stroy; 15 nor that a tax upon net income is a tax on the source of the
income; 16 nor that the economic burden of the tax may be passed on
to the Government, the employee of which is taxed.17
The gradual trend away from immunity reached its climax in
the latest case to come before the Supreme Court-Graves v. New
York ex rel. O'Keefe.18 In this case the respondent, a resident of
New York, and lawyer for the Home Owner's Loan Corporation,
sought a refund of the tax paid upon his salary upon the grounds that
a wholly owned instrumentality of the United States, the Home
Owner's Loan Corporation, is immune from state taxation, and to
tax the employee of the Government's corporation would be to impose
a burden upon and impair a governmental function. The court held
that the imposition of such a tax by the State of New York did not
place an unconstitutional burden upon the Federal Government. "The
immunity sought by the respondent is not ond to be implied from the
Constitution because, if allowed it would impose to an inadmissible
extent a restriction on the taxing power which the Constitution has
reserved to the state governments." 19
The termination of immunity of the governmental and state em-
ployee was consummated by an Act of Congress 20 providing for tax-
ation of state employees by the Federal Government and the taxation
of federal employees by the state government.2 1 It may be contended
that such legislation will be sustained as constitutional, 22 since the
rationale of the doctrine of implied immunity necessary to the pres-
ervation of our dual system of government has been destroyed by
previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
MARY E. BROPHY.
15 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Attorney-General of Massachusetts,
125 U. S. 530, 8 Sup. Ct. 961 (1888) ; City of New Brunswick v. United States,
276 U. S. 547, 48 Sup. Ct. 371 (1928).
26 New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308, 57 Sup. Ct. 466 (1937);
Hale v. State Board, 302 U. S. 95, 58 Sup. Ct. 102 (1937).
17 James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 58 Sup. Ct. 208 (1937);
Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U. S. 376, 58 Sup. Ct. 623 (1938);
Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405, 58 Sup. Ct. 969 (1938) ; Metcalf & Eddy
v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 46 Sup. Ct: 172 (1926); Burnet v. A. T. Jergins
Trust, 288 U. S. 508, 53 Sup. Ct. 439 (1933); McLoughlin v. Commissioner,
303 U. S. 218, 58 Sup. Ct. 539 (1938).
28 306 U. S. 466, 59 Sup. Ct. 595 (1939).
19 Graves v. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, 478, 59 Sup. Ct. 595 (1939).
20 53 STAT. 574, 26 U. S. C. A. §§ 22, 116, 5 U. S. C. A. § 84a (Supp. 1939).
21 "Section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code is amended by inserting
after the words 'compensation for personal service' the following: ('including
personal service as an officer or employee of a state for any political subdivision
thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the fore-
going')."
22 53 STAT. 574, 26 U. S. C. A. §§ 22, 116, 5 U. S. C. A. § 84a (Supp.
1939); see N. Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1940, p. 19, col. 5.
194o0]
